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The score a prospective recruit must earn on the military’s entrance examination was raised in
1980 in response to an error discovered in the score scale previously used. Raising this score led to a
reduction in enlistments, especially among minorities. Recent plans to reduce the military have also
had an adverse impact on service opportunities for minority applicants. This paper considers empirical
and theoretical aspects of the relationship between entrance standards and minority representation in
the military, focusing on racial differences in the proportion of qualified applicants who enlist. The
results suggest that increases in test score standards have a large impact on minority enlistment not
only because minorities have lower scores, but also because qualified minority applicants are far more
likely than other qualified applicants to enlist.The "Misnorming" of the U.S. Military’s Entrance Examination and
Its Effect on Minority Enlistments
1. INTRODUCTION
Many blacks in the United States regard the military as an attractive employment option. The
Defense Department’s current efforts to reduce the Armed Forces may therefore frustrate the plans of a
lot of young blacks. One approach being used to cut the number in uniform is to increase entrance
standards (Defense Department 1992). If military service is a desirable career path for blacks, tougher
admissions requirements could have an especially large impact on them. Indeed, Boesel (1992) and
Laurence (1992) predict that higher entrance standards will disqualify a greater percentage of minority
applicants than of white applicants.
Admissions standards have been raised from time to time. Probably the most famous episode
occurred in 1980, when the score a prospective recruit must earn on the military’s entrance
examination--the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)--was raised in response to an
error discovered in the scoring scale previously used. What is now known as the "misnorming" of the
ASVAB had a profound impact on enlistments, particularly among blacks (U.S. Congress 1989). In
this paper I take a new look at the effect the ASVAB misnorming had on white and black enlistments
during the two years following the incident.
The next section presents data documenting recent changes in social representation in the
military. Section 3 outlines a simple behavioral model of the effect of entrance criteria on enlistment
in the military. The model is not specific to the military selection process and highlights phenomena
common to other application and screening processes such as those used to determine attendance at
selective colleges. Section 4 describes military applicant data for the period 1976–1982 and provides a
brief history of military screening in the late 1970s. The episode now known as the "misnorming" of
the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) is recounted, and a strategy is outlined for2
using this episode to estimate the effect of screening criteria on social representation in the Armed
Forces. Section 5 presents empirical results from this strategy, and Section 6 concludes.
2. SOCIAL REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY: 1979–1992
In 1979, only 64 percent of Army recruits were high school graduates, and 46 percent had
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) test scores between the 10th and 30th percentiles of the
national youth AFQT score distribution.
1 Beginning in 1980, however, test scores and schooling
levels of newly enlisted soldiers improved steadily. This improvement was partly attributable to the
correction of incorrect ASVAB scoring procedures in the late 1970s (described more fully below) and
to legislative limits on the number of low-scoring enlistments;
2 it was also due to poor civilian labor
market conditions and new packages of veterans benefits that made military service relatively attractive
for many young people.
3
By 1987, 93 percent of all new recruits had a high school diploma, and 95 percent had scores
in the top 70 percent of the AFQT score distribution (Categories I–III). At the same time, the fraction
of minority enlistments fell from an all time high of 35.5 percent in 1980 to 24.2 percent in 1983,
rising again to 28.1 percent in 1987 (Defense Department 1988, p. II-33). The fraction of nonwhites
in the U.S. population rose over the same period from 15 to 18 percent. It is important to note,
however, that average minority representation during the period 1976–1980 was a more modest 25
percent, actually somewhat less than the 1985–1987 average of 27 percent. This stability in average
representation was partly attributable to improved representation in services other than the Army, at a
time when nonwhite representation in the Army declined dramatically. Nevertheless, correction of the
ASVAB test scoring error and increases in education and score-related entrance requirements appear to
have made enlistment more difficult for minority applicants (Cooper 1977; Eitelberg 1988; U.S.
Congress 1989; Defense Department 1992).3
The Bush administration’s plan to reduce the size of the Armed Forces by 25 percent over
fiscal years 1991–1995 aggravated concerns about opportunities for minorities in the military
(Laurence 1992). Recent Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) statistics on enlistments, tabulated
by race and test scores and presented in Tables 1 and 2, appear to substantiate these fears. The
number of enlistments by men and women without prior service fell by 27 percent between 1989 and
1992, from 278,000 to 202,000. There was a nearly 30 percent decline in male enlistments.
Enlistments by white males declined by only 25 percent, however, while enlistments by black men--
the group that appears to have been hardest hit by military downsizing--fell by 47 percent.
An important and related change in the characteristics of newly enlisted soldiers is documented
in Table 2, which shows recent enlistment data tabulated by AFQT group. In 1989, there were 17,700
new enlistments by men with AFQT scores in Category IV. In 1992, there were 340. Because black
applicants are much more likely to have scores in Category IV, the elimination of Category IV
enlistments clearly contributed to the decline in black representation in new enlistments from 20
percent in 1989 to 15 percent in 1992.
But the elimination of Category IV enlistments alone cannot explain so large a decline.
Excluding all Category IV enlistments from the 1989 data only reduces black representation to 18
percent. Moreover, enlistments by men without a high school degree are disproportionately likely to
be by white applicants. Tabulations of data not shown in the table indicate that excluding both
Category IV enlistments and enlistments by men without a high school degree would leave black
representation at 18.5 percent. Thus, the precipitous decline in black representation also suggests that
increases in entrance standards can have a larger impact on minority applicants than forecasts based
solely on the distribution of entrance qualifications would predict. In the next section I outline a
simple behavioral model of enlistment and minority representation.4
TABLE 1
Number of Enlistments (in Thousands), by Race
Men Women
Year White Black Hispanic Other White Black Hispanic Other Total
1989
Enlistments 168.5 48.6 15.1 7.6 23.4 11.4 2.2 1.2 278
Percentage 70.3 20.3 6.3 3.2 61.3 29.8 5.8 3.1
1990
Enlistments 136.7 37.7 13.8 6.0 18.4 8.5 1.8 .9 224
Percentage 70.4 19.4 7.1 3.1 62.2 28.7 6.1 3.0
1991
Enlistments 133.2 27.6 13.2 5.8 16.8 6.3 1.7 .9 206
Percentage 74.1 15.4 7.3 3.2 65.4 24.5 6.6 3.5
1992
Enlistments 126.9 26.3 13.1 3.5 19.3 7.2 2.2 1.1 202
Percentage 74.7 15.4 7.7 2.1 64.8 24.2 7.4 3.7
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.
Notes: Percentages are of the total by sex and may not add to 100 because of rounding.5
TABLE 2
Number of Enlistments (in Thousands), by AFQT Group
Men Women
Year I–II IIIa IIIb IV I–II IIIa IIIb IV
1989
Enlistments 90.0 61.3 67.9 17.7 14.4 12.2 11.1 .09
Percentage 37.9 25.6 28.3 7.4 37.8 32.0 29.1 .00
1990
Enlistments 76.8 52.3 56.9 6.8 12.2 10.7 6.5 .02
Percentage 39.6 26.9 29.3 3.5 41.2 36.1 22.0 .00
1991
Enlistments 78.1 49.2 49.8 1.06 11.1 9.7 4.7 .01
Percentage 43.4 27.4 27.7 .01 43.3 37.7 18.3 .00
1992
Enlistments 77.4 50.1 43.3 .34 12.7 10.7 6.2 .03
Percentage 45.1 29.2 25.2 .00 42.6 35.9 20.8 .00
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.
Notes: Percentages are of the total by sex and may not add to 100 because of rounding and because
of unknown AFQT scores. AFQT Group I includes percentile scores 93–100, AFQT Group II
includes percentile scores 65–92, AFQT Group IIIa includes percentile scores 50–64, AFQT Group
IIIb includes percentile scores 31–49, and AFQT Group IV includes percentile scores 10–30. AFQT
Group V includes percentile scores 1–9. Applicants with scores in Group V are barred from
enlistment by law.6
3. THE EFFECT OF ADMISSIONS CRITERIA ON MINORITY REPRESENTATION:
THEORY
The original rationale for military entrance testing was to screen out applicants who could not
be trained to master the skills required of soldiers. Thus, standards should primarily reflect
technological advances or changes in the medical knowledge needed by soldiers (Karpinos 1967.) In
practice, however, standards have often been changed to accommodate shifting demands for military
manpower and changes in manpower availability (Eitelberg, Lawrence, Waters, and Perelman 1984;
Karpinos 1967.)
Entrance standards affect the social mix in the military in at least three ways. First, there is
the direct effect: higher standards mean fewer individuals from different groups are qualified. If the
distribution of qualifications differs across groups, then the direct effect works to change the social
composition of the armed forces. Second, entrance standards affect the incentive to apply to the
military. Applicants who believe they have little chance of satisfying entrance criteria are less likely
to go through a costly and time-consuming enlistment process. Third, changes in standards may
change the distribution of enlistment probabilities in the pool of qualified applicants. For example, if
applicants in certain groups who are disqualified by increased standards would not have enlisted
anyway, then increased standards would have little impact on enlistments by members of this group.
On the other hand, groups with a high propensity to follow through with enlistment are more likely to
be hurt by increases in standards.
These three features of the applicant screening process are highlighted by a simple behavioral
model based on comparisons of expected utilities and costs. First, define the events: E = successful
enlistment, A = application for enlistment, Q = qualified for enlistment, and M = membership in a
demographic group of interest such as a minority group. Because E occurs only if A and Q occur, the
probability of successful enlistment by a member of group M can be decomposed as follows:7
(1) Pr[EM ] = Pr[E M ,A ,Q ] Pr[QM , A ] Pr[AM ].
In words, successful enlistment begins with an application, applicants must be found to be qualified,
and finally, qualified applicants must follow through with actual enlistment.
The direct effect of qualification standards is Pr[QM , A ]. This probability is given by the
distribution of applicant qualifications and military entrance standards; it has no behavioral component.
For example, if applicant qualifications are denoted by q and the entrance standard is k, then the
probability of meeting this standard is Pr[q > k M, A].
The most important modification of the direct effect of entrance standards on minority
applicants stems from the fact (documented below) that the probability of enlistment conditional on
application and qualification is significantly higher for minorities than for members of other groups.
This probability, Pr[E M ,A ,Q ], multiplies the direct effect of changes in qualifications. Therefore, a
given number of disqualified minority applicants would have a larger impact on minority enlistments
than would the same number of white disqualifications on white enlistments.
Behavioral components of the enlistment process also include the impact of standards on the
decision to apply, an event which occurs with probability Pr[AM ]. To model this decision, suppose
that the utility of voluntary service and civilian alternatives can be characterized by random variables
uv and uc. Suppose also that potential applicants to the military face a cost of application of the
amount q, and that the applicants’ subjective probability of meeting enlistment standards is pq.
Finally, suppose that the applicants’ subjective probability of following through with enlistment, if
qualified, is pe. If the applicants’ expectations are realistic, then pq = Pr[QM , A ] and pe = Pr[EM ,
A, Q], but this need not be the case. An applicant who chooses to apply by comparing expected
utilities enlists if8
uv[pqpe]+u c[ 1-p qpe]-q >u c,
or, equivalently,
(2) [uv -u c]pqpe > q.
Changes in qualifications can be seen to affect the probability of application through their
impact on pq and pe. These probabilities are subjective assessments by individuals in the pool of
applicants. But potential applicants’ evaluation of the chances of acceptance are tied to actual
acceptance standards by virtue of the recruiter practice of giving prospective applicants a "mini-AFQT"
or other preliminary screening test before beginning the official application process.
4 Thus, it seems
likely that an increase in entrance standards will tend to reduce an applicant’s subjective probability of
meeting enlistment standards, pq. This reduces the incentive to enlist because it reduces the expected
payoff from application. Groups for whom the increase in standards reduces pq the most are more
likely to be discouraged from applying.
The application decision rule, (2), also has the simple implication that anyone who chooses to
apply to the military (and faces positive application costs) expects military service to be more
attractive than a civilian career at the time of application. Yet applications data show that large
numbers of qualified applicants do not follow through with enlistment. Orvis and Gahart (1990, p. vii)
suggest that one reason many qualified applicants do not enlist is that, "even after application, civilian
job opportunities, social support for enlisting, college plans, and finances have substantial effects on
the enlistment decisions of young men."
5
To model this process of reassessment, I assume that information about civilian opportunities
can be characterized by random variables added to applicants’ original evaluations of civilian and
military opportunities. In particular, revised assessments are characterized by:9
u
~
v =u v + hv and u
~
c =u c + hc,
where hv and hc are random variables representing new information. Then we
can write




c >0 ( u v -u c)>q/pqpe, q > k, M].
Another way to write this is
(4) Pr[E M ,A ,Q ]=P r[ u v -u c > h (uv -u c)>q/pqpe, q > k, M],




c)]. Note that even if applicants’ revised assessments of civilian
and military opportunities are independent of their original assessments, the change in relative
assessments, h, is likely to be positively correlated with (uv -u c).
Changes in enlistment standards can be seen to affect the probability of enlistment by
applicants through the conditioning arguments in (3). Consider first conditioning on application. An
applicant is someone for whom it is true that (uv -u c)>q/pqpe. If an increase in standards raises the
application threshold (q/pqpe), then conditioning on application raises the probability that (uv -u c)
exceeds any constant number. On the other hand, this effect is moderated by the fact that h, the





c, are independent of the original assessments in the pool of qualified
applicants, conditioning on application has no impact on the probability of enlistment.
The last effect captured in equation (4) is a function of the correlation between qualifications,
q, and individual assessments of civilian and military opportunities. Conditioning on qualification (q >
k) can either reduce or increase the probability of enlistment when enlistment standards are raised.10





military ranks applicants largely on the basis of measures of general human capital (schooling and test




c in the pool of qualified applicants. On
the other hand, in the population choosing to apply, an increase in certain types of qualification
standards could work to select those applicants with the best military prospects.
4. APPLICANT SCREENING AND ENLISTMENT: 1976–1982
In January 1976, the Armed Forces introduced a new entrance examination for the purpose of
screening applicants to all services. The new ASVAB test, like previous military exams, consisted of
a number of subtests that were used individually and in the form of composites. The most important
composite was the AFQT, which was used to screen out unqualified applicants and to keep track of
the quality of entrants to the military. Recruiters typically attempt to get as many high-AFQT
applicants as possible.
A history of the AFQT and other applicant screening tests in use since World War II is
presented in Table 3. The AFQT originated as part of the Army General Qualifications Test (AGCT),
used to screen and classify servicemen and women during World War II. Eight AFQT test forms
common to all services were used as part of service-specific test batteries from 1951 to 1973. In any
ongoing testing program like the AFQT, an effort is made to ensure that the test score scale has the
same meaning when new versions of the test are introduced. The process of establishing equivalence is
called test-equating or norming. AFQT test forms were normed using a technique known as
equipercentile equating, described in Maier and Truss (1983, appendix B) and briefly summarized in
the appendix to this paper.
Between 1973 and 1975, the military did not require each service to use a common AFQT
measure when screening and classifying applicants. During this period, the individual services11
TABLE 3
History of Armed Services Applicant Screening Tests
Test Forms Event Date
AGCT and NGCT Used by the Army and Navy for WWII
classification and assignment
AGCT Used by the Army for enlistment late
screening 1940s
AFQT 1–6 Implemented by Army 1950
(composite from
subtests common to service- Implemented by all services 1951
specific batteries, e.g.,
ACB, NBTB) Each new AFQT form normed
to WWII Mobilization
Population in 1944 through
readministration of AGCT (which
included AFQT subtests)
Congress outlaws inductions from June 1951
Mental Group V
AFQT 7–8 Used in Vietnam era 1960–1972
(composite from
subtests common to service- Normed to WWII Mobilization Population
specific batteries) as before
ASVAB 2 used in high school
testing program 1968
Draft ends July 1973
Service-specific ASVAB 3 in Navy, Air Force 1973–1975
composites and batteries
Army uses ACB-73 1973




Test Forms Event Date
ASVAB 5/6/7 Implemented by Defense Department January
using "original score scale" 1976
Initially normed against Navy
and Air Force recruits using
ASVAB 2/AFQT as reference and
low-ability applicants using ACB-73/AFQT
as reference
Early evidence of misnorming April 1976
ASVAB 5/6/7 New "operational score scale" September
introduced; this lowered scores 1976
in Mental Groups I, II, and III
Navy revises mental group April 1977
definitions to generate ability
distribution closer to AFQT
from NBTB-75
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) January
publishes report showing original 1979
scale was much too easy, and 1976
operational scale only partially corrected
this
Second CNA study suggests major May 1979
norming errors at low aptitudes
and produces a new scale
Results from Army Research Institute (ARI) October
study confirm second CNA study 1979
and produce another new scale
Three independent studies confirm Spring
misnorming and produce ultimate 1980
"corrected score scale" normed by the
Educational Testing Service to AFQT 7A
(table continues)13
TABLE 3 (continued)
Test Forms Event Date
Corrected score scale adopted, October
normed to WWII Mobilization 1980
Population, used to retrospectively
evaluate recruit quality for 1976–1980
ASVAB 8/9/10 Replaces ASVAB 5/6/7 October
1980
ASVAB 8/9/10 normed and score scale
calibrated using orthodox test equating
procedures and the Vietnam-era AFQT 7A
as reference test under WWII
Mobilization Population norms
Corrected score scale for ASVAB March 1983
5/6/7 validated against
ASVAB 8/9/10 scale
ASVAB 8A Test form administered to all participants Fall 1980
in the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY) by NORC to produce a
new 1980 Profiles of American Youth
Study reference population
New 1980 Profiles of American Youth October
Study score scale introduced 1984
1980 Profiles of American Youth Study
norms become standard; historical
AFQT data reported against these norms
using WWII Mobilization Population/1980
Youth Study conversion tables
a
Corrected WWII Mobilization Population
and 1980 Profiles of American Youth
Study scales are shown to be similar
(table continues)14
TABLE 3 (continued)
Test Forms Event Date
ASVAB 11/12/13 New test forms introduced October
1984
1980 Profiles of American Youth Study
norms become standard
Source: Information in this table is compiled from ASVAB Working Group (1980), Maier and Truss
(1983), and Maier and Sims (1986).
Notes: AGCT and NGCT are the Army and Navy General Classification Tests. ACB is the Army
Classification Battery, NBTB is the Navy Basic Test Battery. ASVAB is the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery. The AFQT is a composite computed from scores on subtests in batteries
such as ASVAB, ACB, and NBTB after 1950. From 1950–1953, the AFQT composite was the same
as that on the original AGCT, including Verbal, Arithmetic Reasoning, and Spacial Relationships
subtests. From 1953–1973 a Tool Knowledge subtest was added. For ASVAB 5/6/7, the AFQT
composite was the sum of subtest scores for Word Knowledge, Arithmetic Reasoning, and Spacial
Relationships. For ASVAB 8/9/10, the AFQT composite was the sum of Word Knowledge,
Arithmetic Reasoning, Paragraph Comprehension, and half the score on the Numerical Operations
subtest.
aConversion of historical Military Entrance Processing Command data to 1980 score scales performed
in 1985 by Les Willis of the DMDC on the basis of unpublished tables underlying Figures 1–3,
pp. 1–18 in Maier and Sims (1986).15
employed a variety of different tests, with service-specific scoring norms. The introduction of the
ASVAB 5/6/7 forms in 1976 marked a return to a service-wide AFQT. Initially, however, no attempt
was made to accurately equate the score scale to norms from the previous reference population of men
at risk of being drafted for service in World War II. A variety of ad hoc procedures were used
instead.
6 Consequently, AFQT percentile scores on ASVAB 5/6/7 did not reflect the same level of
ability as did earlier scores.
Errors in the ASVAB 5/6/7 score scale were first discovered in late 1976 and were partially
corrected when a new "operational score scale" was introduced shortly thereafter. But in early 1979,
studies by the Center for Naval Analyses found that the operational score scale was still too easy and
that large numbers of new recruits would not have been accepted for service under traditional entrance
standards. By late 1979 new sets of corrected score scales had been produced by the ASVAB
Working Group (in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserves, and
Logistics.)
In early 1980 the ASVAB Working Group, in cooperation with the Educational Testing
Service, constructed a corrected score scale for ASVAB 5/6/7 that had been carefully normed to a
Vietnam-era AFQT test (Form 7A) in samples of eleventh and twelfth graders. At the same time, a
new set of forms, ASVAB 8/9/10, was also normed to AFQT 7A (Maier and Truss 1983, Appendix
H). In October 1980, ASVAB 8/9/10 replaced ASVAB 5/6/7, and the corrected score scale for
ASVAB 5/6/7 became the official scale for the purposes of historical comparisons. Validation studies
suggested that AFQT scores on the corrected score scale reflected the same level of ability as pre-1973
AFQT tests. Note, however, that even though scores on ASVAB 5/6/7 and ASVAB 8/9/10 were both
normed to AFQT 7A, AFQT scores from the two sets of forms may not be comparable because the
formula for the AFQT composite changed (see the notes to Table 3.)
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For the purposes of this project, the importance of changes in score scales between 1976 and
1982 is that these changes led to large differences in the probability that low-ability applicants would
be accepted into the Armed Forces. An applicant whose AFQT score from a correctly normed test put
him in Mental Group IV would have had a much higher chance of being accepted into the military if
he had applied between 1976 and 1979 than in late 1980 or later. An applicant in Mental Group V
would not have been accepted at all except for misnorming. The incorrect norming of the original
ASVAB therefore generates a natural experiment that can be used to identify the effects of entrance
standards on social representation in the military.
The data analyzed here come from annual DMDC files containing information on all
applicants and entrants to the military in a fiscal year. One computerized record is generated each
time an applicant makes contact with military recruiters or examiners. These records indicate the date
and type of contact (examination results, enlistment into the Delayed Entry program [DEP], enlistment
to active duty, and discharge from DEP without active-duty enlistment). Each record also reports
basic demographic information, physical examination results and test scores, and terms and conditions
of enlistment for entrants.
8 Files for fiscal years 1976 to 1982 contain the population of applicants
used in this study.
Applicant records do not indicate whether applicants eventually enlist in the military. But
both applicants’ and entrants’ records contain Social Security Numbers (SSNs) that I have used to link
the two types of records. Details of this link are outlined in Table 4. The match was accomplished by
splitting each fiscal-year file, recording one to two million contacts, into separate data sets containing
records for applicants and all other contacts. At this stage only applicants and entrants without prior
military service who were identified as being sixteen to twenty-five years old when applying or
entering the military were retained (row 1 of Table 4 shows initial record counts for applicants).
Additional selection criteria retained only seventeen- to twenty-one-year-old applicants17
TABLE 4
Military Applicant Population (in Thousands), 1976–1982
Calendar Year
Characteristics Total 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982




2. Keep if aged 17–21 at 4,186 589 539 491 542 699 766 560
application, with valid
sex, race codes, & AFQT
scores; if tested on
ASVAB 5/6/7 or a later
form; if no education
beyond college at
application
3. Drop observations with 4,160
negative waiting times or
greater than two years
waiting time between
application and entry




5. Percentage identified 50 50 53 52 49 45 48
as entrants in match
6. Applicants nonwhite white men: 2,179 nonwhite men: 865
by race and sex white women: 453 nonwhite women: 231
Notes: Data are from applicant record tapes for FY76–FY82; calendar year data for 1982 are for
FY82 only (through September 30, 1982). Observations with a calendar year inconsistent with the
fiscal year were dropped at row 1. Match procedures are described in text.18
who were tested on ASVAB 5/6/7 or later forms, and dropped those without valid sex, race, and
AFQT variables. Applicants with more than a college degree at entry were also discarded. The
resulting record counts are in row 2 of Table 4.
For each applicant’s file for a fiscal year, I searched for a record with the same SSN in the
entrants file for that same year, as well as the entrants files for two fiscal years ahead. Applicants for
whom an entrants record was found, and whose record identification code showed active-duty service,
were identified as veterans in the match. Multiple entrants in a three-year period were given the most
recent entrants record, and duplicate applicant records were discarded. The final applicants/entrants
data set had approximately 3.7 million observations.
5. THE EFFECT OF ADMISSIONS CRITERIA ON MINORITY REPRESENTATION:
ESTIMATION
5.1 Graphical Evidence
In the remainder of this paper, I focus on male applicants without prior military service, who
applied to enter the military in fiscal years 1976–1982.
9 Figures 1 and 2 plot data from the
1976–1982 applicants/entrants match showing the probability of enlistment by year and correctly
normed AFQT score. These figures provide dramatic evidence of the effects of the ASVAB
misnorming. For whites and nonwhites separately, the figures plot eight lines for the time series of
enlistment probabilities in the eight AFQT mental groups, minus the probability of enlistment for that
mental group in 1982. For example, the first point plotted on the line labeled 4b in Figure 1 indicates
that applicants whose correctly normed AFQT score put them in Mental Group IVb were roughly 25
percentage points more likely to enlist in 1976 than in 1982. In each of the lowest mental groups
(IVa, IVb, IVc, and V) there was a substantially higher probability of enlisting in 1976–197919
Figure 1 here20
Figure 2 here21
than in 1980–1982. By 1981 there was almost no difference in the probability of enlisting by mental
group (relative to the base year, 1982.)
Figures 3 and 4 further emphasize the effects of misnorming by subtracting the line for AFQT
Group I applicants from the lines for all other groups in order to control for common-year effects. For
example, Figure 3 indicates that white applicants whose correctly normed AFQT score put them in
Mental Group IVb were almost 30 percentage points more likely to enlist in 1977 and 1978 than in
1982, after controlling for year effects common to all AFQT groups. Figures 3 and 4 show that even
Mental Group 3b was affected by the ASVAB misnorming.
5.2 Measurement Framework
The return to traditional test score standards after correction of the ASVAB misnorming in
1980 resulted in the disqualification of a disproportionately large number of black applicants.
Eitelberg (1988, Table 46) estimates that 25.6 percent of all the men who enlisted between 1976 and
1980 and 41 percent of the black men who enlisted in this period would not have qualified under
traditional standards. In this subsection, I focus on the adverse impact of higher standards from the
point of view of the applicant. Using the applicants/entrants match, I am able to decompose the total
effect of higher standards into the direct effect and a behavioral component operating through the
conditional probability Pr[EM , A, Q].
The statistical analysis is based on a 30 percent random sample of the population described in
row 2 of Table 4.
10 There are 699,947 white applicants and 286,918 nonwhite applicants in the
sample. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. Columns 1 and 4 show the proportion
of white and nonwhite applicants meeting basic enlistment standards. For the purposes of the table, an
applicant was determined to have satisfied the basic standard if he had a high school diploma and an
AFQT score of 16 or more, or a GED or no high school diploma but an AFQT score of 31 or more.




Qualification Probabilities: Proportion Meeting Basic Test Score and Schooling Standards
Whites Nonwhites
Mean Mean
Proportion Interaction Terms Proportion Interaction Terms
Year Qualifying AFQT Group IV AFQT Group V Qualifying AFQT Group IV AFQT Group V
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1976 .84 .276 .018 .57 .154 .011
(.003) (.006) (.008) (.010)
1977 .87 .374 .016 .60 .207 .010
(.003) (.007) (.008) (.010)
1978 .87 .368 .009 .61 .187 .008
(.003) (.007) (.008) (.011)
1979 .87 .374 .002 .61 .188 .003
(.003) (.007) (.008) (.011)
1980 .86 .295 .0002 .59 .145 .0002
(.003) (.006) (.007) (.010)
1981 .76 -.090 -.000 .48 -.121 .000
(.003) (.006) (.007) (.010)
1982 .84 reference year .64 reference year
Sample 699,947 286,918
Notes: Columns 1 and 4 show the proportion of applicants meeting the following criteria: high school graduates with
AFQT scores of 16 or greater, or GED and non-high-school graduates with AFQT scores of 31 or greater. For the
purposes of this calculation, AFQT scores are determined on the basis of score scales in force at the time of application
(incorrect 1944 norms until October 1980, correct 1944 norms thereafter). The remaining columns report the interaction
terms in a regression of the qualification dummy on year effects, main effects for AFQT Groups IIIB, IV, and V, and
year-by-AFQT-group interaction effects for these three groups. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample is 30 percent
of row 2 in Table 4, minus duplicate observations and observations on veterans with negative waiting times or waiting
times greater than two years between application and service.25
throughout the sample period. I used the AFQT scaled scores in force at the time of application (based on
incorrect 1944 norms until October 1980, and correct 1944 norms thereafter)
11 to assign the qualification
dummy. White applicants were substantially more likely to meet minimum enlistment standards than nonwhites,
and for both groups there was a substantial drop in qualification proportions in 1981 after the ASVAB
misnorming had been corrected.
Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 report the interaction terms in a regression of the qualification dummy on year
effects, main effects for AFQT Groups IIIB, IV, and V, and year-by-AFQT interaction terms for these three
groups. The AFQT dummies on the right-hand side of the estimating equation indicate "true" AFQT scores
calculated on the basis of a correctly normed (1980) score scale. The estimating equation is:
(5) Qit = a + å ditbt + å aikgk + åå(dit aik) dtk + eit
tkt k
t = 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81
k = AFQT Group IIIb, AFQT Group IV, AFQT Group V,
where Qit is a dummy variable that indicates whether applicant i met basic schooling and test score standards at
the time of application; dit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if applicant i applied in year t; and aik is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if i has a correctly scaled AFQT score in group k. The regression coefficients bt
and gk are period and AFQT-group main effects. The interaction terms, dtk, show how much more likely low-
ability recruits with AFQT scores in group k were to be classified as meeting basic standards during the
misnorming period than they were subsequently. The interaction terms in this equation were computed in the
same manner as the interaction terms plotted in Figures 3 and 4.
The estimates in Column 2 of Table 5 indicate that a white applicant whose correctly scaled score would
have placed him in AFQT Group IV was 37 percentage points more likely to have been classified as meeting
basic standards in 1977 than in 1982. The corresponding figure for nonwhite applicants is 21 percentage points.26
The reason the impact of misnorming on qualifications is lower for nonwhites is that nonwhite applicants were
more likely than white applicants to be high school graduates.
Columns 1 and 4 of Table 6 show the percentage of applicants successfully enlisting. Here the
percentages for whites and nonwhites are much closer than those for qualification, although white applicants
were consistently more likely to enlist than nonwhite applicants. The probability of enlistment dropped sharply
between 1980 and 1981, again reflecting the correction of test-score misnorming. The interaction terms in
columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 correspond to those reported for qualifications in Table 5. These are interaction terms
from a version of equation (5) where the dependent variable is enlistment. A white applicant whose true AFQT
score would put him in AFQT Group IV was 22 percentage points more likely to enter the military in 1977 than
in 1982. The corresponding figure for nonwhites is 20 percent.
Overall, the estimates in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that, conditional on correctly scaled AFQT test scores,
test-score misnorming led to similar increases in white and nonwhite enlistments. Yet the impact of misnorming
on qualification was much stronger for whites than for nonwhites. To explain this finding, note that the
relationship between qualifications and enlistment can be decomposed using the following identity:
(6) Pr[Eit=1 bi, Ait=1, Qit] = Pr[Eit=1 bi, Ait=1, Qit=0]
+Q it{Pr[Eit=1 bi, Ait=1, Qit=1] - Pr[Eit=1 bi, Ait=1, Qit=0]},27
TABLE 6
Enlistment Probabilities: Proportion Successfully Enlisting
Whites Nonwhites
Mean Mean
Proportion Interaction Terms Proportion Interaction Terms
Year Enlisting AFQT Group IV AFQT Group V Enlisting AFQT Group IV AFQT Group V
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1976 .53 .194 .112 .43 .161 .123
(.005) (.013) (.010) (.013)
1977 .51 .219 .128 .45 .196 .141
(.005) (.013) (.010) (.013)
1978 .54 .222 .138 .49 .193 .110
(.006) (.014) (.010) (.013)
1979 .54 .213 .066 .45 .174 .062
(.005) (.014) (.010) (.013)
1980 .53 .131 .007 .40 .101 .013
(.005) (.013) (.009) (.013)
1981 .48 -.012 -.004 .35 -.025 -.001
(.005) (.013) (.009) (.013)
1982 .52 reference year .43 reference year
Sample 699,947 286,918
Notes: Columns 1 and 4 show the proportion of applicants enlisting to active duty. The remaining columns report the
interaction terms in a regression of an enlistment dummy on year effects, main effects for AFQT Groups IIIB, IV, and V,
and year-by-AFQT-group interaction effects for these three groups. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample is 30
percent of row 2 in Table 4, minus duplicate observations and observations on veterans with negative waiting times or
waiting times greater than two years between application and service.28
where bi is a variable representing applicant i’s correctly scaled AFQT score. For the purposes of the analysis
that follows, Pr[Eit=1 bi, Ait=1, Qit=0] is not always zero because the qualification variable, Qit=0, is only an
approximate indicator of applicant qualifications.
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To identify the effect of changes in qualifications on the probability of enlistment, I combine (6) with a
linear model:
Pr[Eit=1 bi, Ait=1, Qit=0] = ab + bt + eit
Pr[Eit=1 bi, Ait=1, Qit=1] - Pr[Eit=1 bi, Ait=1, Qit=0] = ft,
where ab is an AFQT-group effect, bt is a period effect, eit is an idiosyncratic component for individual i at
time t, and ft is the time-varying effect of qualifications. This leads to the estimating equation
(7) Pr[Eit=1 bi, Ait=1, Qit]=ab + bt +Q itft + eit.
It is necessary to control for period effects because enlistment rates and the quality of enlistments generally
follow the unemployment rate (Dale and Gilroy 1985). In principle, the parameters of equation (7) can be
estimated using a linear probability model or other functional form to regress an enlistment dummy on a
qualifications dummy, along with period effects and AFQT-group effects. Coefficients on interactions of Qit
with dummies for demographic groups may show how the effect of qualification (or disqualification) differs for
different groups.
It is important to note, however, that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of equation (7) do not
necessarily lead to estimates of ft with a causal interpretation. In other words, the resulting estimates of ft may
not tell us how likely an arbitrarily or exogenously disqualified applicant would have been to enlist. This is
because the behavior of qualified applicants may differ systematically from the behavior of those who are not
qualified, and because the military uses information on enlistments when setting qualification standards.
13 One
way to overcome this problem is to assume that although eit may be correlated with Qit, it is not correlated29
with bi in the population where Ait=1. Then, taking expectations of both sides of (7) conditional on bi and Ait=1
alone, we have
(8) Pr[Eit=1 bi, Ait=1] = ab + bt + Pr[Qit=1 bi, Ait=1]ft.
The first step in estimating equation (8) is to estimate Pr[Qit=1 bi, Ait=1]. Then causal estimates of ft can be
computed from a regression of the estimated probability of enlistment by year and true AFQT group on AFQT-
group effects, year effects, and the estimated probability of meeting basic qualification standards by year and true
AFQT group.
This estimation strategy can be interpreted as a decomposition of the probability of enlistment
conditional on application into a component which represents the direct effect of qualifications, Pr[Qit=1 bi,
Ait=1], and a behavioral component, ft, which indicates how likely qualified applicants are to follow through with
enlistment. One simple way to estimate ft is to divide the interaction terms in Table 5 (showing the relationship
between true AFQT scores and qualifications each year) by the interaction terms in Table 6 (showing the
relationship between true AFQT scores and basic enlistments in each year). More generally, estimates of ft can
be computed using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). 2SLS estimates are computed by regressing Qit on a full
set of AFQT-group and year effects and interaction terms, and then regressing Eit on the fitted values from this
"first-stage" equation using equation (8) in the second stage. In this case, ft is identified by the exclusion of
interaction terms from the second stage.
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5.3 Estimation Results
Table 7 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation (7) for two different measures of applicant
qualifications (2SLS estimates of equation (7) are the same as weighted least squares estimates of equation (8)
when Pr[Qit=1 bi, Ait=1] is replaced by regression estimates [Theil 1971].) The first measure is the basic
qualifications dummy used in Table 5. The second is an attempt to more precisely code the exact age, test score,30
and schooling standards used by the Army in each year from 1976–1982. Information used to compute the
Army qualifications dummy is from Eitelberg et al. (1984, Appendix A).
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 report OLS estimates of the coefficient ft in equation (8), where Qit is the
basic qualifications dummy. The first row of the table shows a pooled estimate for all years. The interpretation
of these estimates is that disqualifying a white applicant reduces his probability of enlistment by .315, while
disqualifying a nonwhite applicant reduces his probability of enlistment by .320.
The OLS estimates summarize the correlation between qualifications and enlistment conditional on year
effects and AFQT-group effects. But since qualification is related to personal characteristics (like age and
schooling) that are associated with the propensity to enlist for other reasons, this correlation probably does not
have a causal interpretation. The 2SLS estimates could differ from the OLS estimates because the 2SLS
estimates are constructed by discarding all variation in qualifications other than that associated with changes in
the way AFQT scores were scaled over time. Thus, the 2SLS estimates can be thought of as the results from a
natural experiment designed to estimate the effect of higher test-score cutoffs.
2SLS estimates, reported in columns 3 and 4, show a much larger impact of disqualification on
enlistment, as well as a substantial difference in the impact of disqualification by race. The estimates in columns
3 and 4 indicate that, on average across all years in the sample, disqualifying a31
TABLE 7
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Basic Standards on Enlistment
Regressor
Basic Qualifications Army Qualifications
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Whites Nonwhites Whites Nonwhites Whites Nonwhites Whites Nonwhites
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1976–1982 .315 .320 .477 .575 .263 .293 .448 .559
(.002) (.002) (.007) (.015) (.002) (.002) (.007) (.015)
1976 .279 .282 .325 .439 .257 .266 .251 .407
(.004) (.005) (.013) (.018) (.004) (.005) (.013) (.018)
1977 .261 .274 .311 .432 .213 .245 .228 .407
(.005) (.005) (.014) (.018) (.005) (.005) (.014) (.018)
1978 .232 .268 .298 .455 .106 .196 .170 .452
(.005) (.005) (.014) (.018) (.004) (.005) (.012) (.020)
1979 .299 .335 .367 .500 .226 .301 .275 .480
(.005) (.005) (.014) (.018) (.005) (.005) (.014) (.019)
1980 .365 .384 .442 .542 .348 .371 .368 .512
(.004) (.005) (.013) (.018) (.004) (.005) (.013) (.018)
1981 .351 .345 .423 .549 .337 .333 .380 .526
(.003) (.004) (.008) (.015) (.003) (.004) (.008) (.016)
1982 .334 .320 .441 .585 .321 .321 .397 .562
(.004) (.005) (.009) (.017) (.004) (.005) (.010) (.017)
Notes: The table reports coefficients from a regression of an enlistment dummy on a qualification dummy. Other
covariates include a full set of year effects and main effects for AFQT Groups IIIB, IV, and V. The 2SLS estimates are
identified by the exclusion of year-by-AFQT-group interaction terms, which were also included in the first-stage equation
used to compute fitted values of the qualification dummy. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample is 30 percent of
row 2 in Table 4, minus duplicate observations and observations on veterans with negative waiting times or waiting times
greater than two years between application and service.32
white applicant reduces his probability of enlistment by .477, whereas disqualifying one nonwhite applicant
reduces his probability of enlistment by .575. Put differently, the reduction in nonwhite enlistments caused by
disqualifying one thousand nonwhite applicants would be 20 percent larger (575 - 477 = 98) than the reduction
in white enlistments caused by disqualifying one thousand white applicants. 2SLS estimates using the Army
qualifications dummy show an average 25 percent differential impact by race. The fact that minority applicants
are typically less likely to be qualified serves to accentuate this differential impact.
In each column, the time-varying 2SLS estimates of the effect of disqualification for whites and
nonwhites indicate that the proportion of qualified applicants continuing on to enlist increased over time. This
finding is consistent with the theoretical implication, discussed in Section 3, that as standards are raised the
remaining pool of qualified applicants is more likely to enlist. The increase in enlistment probabilities is slightly
larger for nonwhites.
5.4 The Behavioral Impact
The 1982 data for applicants illustrate the importance of the behavioral component of enlistment for the
Armed Forces racial mix. In the 1982 applicant population analyzed here, roughly 268.4 thousand white male
applicants satisfied basic test score and schooling standards, and roughly 73.9 thousand nonwhite male applicants
satisfied these standards. A simple calculation suggests that an increase in basic standards achieved by
disqualifying all applicants with AFQT percentile scores in Category IV (below the 30th percentile) would have
left roughly 248.1 thousand white applicants qualified and 50.3 thousand nonwhite applicants qualified. The
increase in standards therefore would have disqualified 20.3 thousand white applicants and 23.6 thousand
nonwhite applicants.
If the proportion of qualified applicants enlisting was equal to the average proportion for both groups
combined (roughly 50 percent), then 16 percent more nonwhite than white enlistments would be lost by the
elimination of AFQT-IV’s from the applicant pool. In numbers, 10.2 thousand white enlistments would be lost
and 11.8 thousand nonwhite enlistments would be lost, a difference of 1.6 thousand. But the estimates in Table
7 suggest that the proportion of qualified applicants enlisting differs substantially by race. The impact of33
disqualification is largest in 1982; estimates for 1982 imply that disqualification of one thousand white applicants
eliminates 441 white enlistments, whereas disqualification of one thousand nonwhite applicants eliminates 585
nonwhite enlistments. Applying these proportions in the example above leads to an estimated loss of 8.9
thousand white enlistments and 13.8 thousand nonwhite enlistments. In this case, roughly 55 percent more
nonwhite enlistments than white enlistments are lost by the elimination of AFQT-IV’s from the applicant pool.
This calculation suggests that the behavioral component of enlistment could more than triple the difference
between the number of white and nonwhite enlistments lost when entrance standards are raised.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The most important change in entrance standards used to screen applicants for the All-Volunteer Forces
was the unintentional ASVAB misnorming. In this paper, I used linked data on military applicants and entrants
to show that the increase in entrance standards resulting from correction of the ASVAB misnorming had a larger
impact on minority enlistments than on white enlistments for at least two reasons. First, minority applicants
were less likely to satisfy military entrance criteria than white applicants. Second, a disqualified minority
applicant was otherwise more likely to enlist than was a disqualified white applicant.
For both racial groups, increases in standards led to higher rates of enlistment among qualified
applicants. This increase was slightly larger for nonwhite applicants. Overall, however, estimates suggest that
since the ASVAB misnorming episode, which resulted in higher test-score cutoffs, minority enlistments have
decreased an average of 20 to 25 percent more than have white enlistments. This difference has occurred
independently of any discouraging impact that higher standards may have had on potential applicants.
Much of the research on job performance in the military suggests that high school graduation status is a
better predictor of success on the job than are test scores. For example, a number of studies suggest that the
potentially unqualified men admitted during the ASVAB misnorming episode, as well as a group of low-ability
men admitted in the late 1960s and early 1970s, did not perform significantly worse than other groups in the
military (e.g., Ramsberger and Means 1987). Recent studies of groups of Navy (Cooke and Quester 1992) and34
Army (Fernandez 1992) recruits suggest that for some population subgroups, there is an association between test
scores, job performance, and recruit retention rates. But the Navy study suggests that schooling levels are a
more important predictor of military job performance.
Although minority applicants to the military have poorer test scores than white applicants, minority
applicants are slightly more likely than white applicants to have graduated from high school (Defense
Department 1992). Overall, in fiscal year 1991, 97 percent of new recruits had a high school diploma, and most
of the remainder had a GED or other alternative credential (Defense Department 1992). This high proportion,
however, partly reflects recent increases in test-score cutoffs that could be relaxed in the future. For example, in
1987, when test-score cutoffs were lower, 93 percent of applicants were high school graduates. Increases in
standards based on school graduation and school performance might therefore be a practical alternative that could
lead to better-performing recruits without disqualifying a disproportionately large number of minority applicants.35
Appendix: Equipercentile Equating and the AFQT
Equipercentile equating begins by first establishing a reference population and a reference test, against which
all test scores are to be measured. The reference population for AFQT test forms until 1973 (through AFQT
Form 8) is known as the World War II Mobilization Population. This is the population of all men on active duty
in December 1944, most of whom took the AGCT. In equating AFQT score scales, the AGCT was used as a
reference test. The score scale for each new AFQT test was determined by administering both the AGCT
reference test and the new test to a sample assumed to have the same underlying ability distribution as the
reference population. When equating tests, an effort is also usually made to administer the new test under the
same conditions as those under which the reference population was originally tested.
The score scale for each new AFQT was determined by equating percentiles for both the new test form
and the reference test in a sample of test takers. Formally, let X denote the raw score on the reference test, and
let Y denote the raw score on the new test; let F and G denote the cumulative distribution functions. Then the
scaled score on the new test is Y
* =F
-1[G(Y)].
Test equating ensures that the distribution of the scaled score on the new test, Y
*, will be the same as
the distribution of the score on the reference test. Scaled scores are then reported as percentiles of the reference
test score distribution, and are said to be normed to the reference population. The hope is that percentile scores
on the new test, having been normed to the reference population, indicate the same level of ability as percentile
scores attained by the reference population. More sophisticated variants of the basic technique described here,
such as Common Item Equating (Holland and Rubin 1982), can be used when the reference population is thought
to differ importantly from the new population. Techniques are available to validate equating procedures.3637
Notes
1Statistics from U.S. Congress (1989, p. 5). AFQT mental groups are assigned to percentile scores
as follows: Group V = percentile score 1–9, Group IV = percentile score 10–30, Group III = percentile
score 31–64, Group II = percentile score 65–92, Group I = percentile score 93 and above.
2Effective October 1, 1981, the fraction of AFQT Category IV enlistments was limited to 80
percent for any fiscal year. This constraint was never binding. But no person with an AFQT score
below 31 (Category IV or V) who was not a high school graduate could be accepted for enlistment
(Defense Department 1988, p. II-23) after October 1981. Category V enlistments were outlawed in
1951.
3Experimental evidence on the importance of veterans benefits in stimulating enlistment is
described by Fernandez (1982). Angrist (1993) shows that veterans benefits probably help to raise the
level of postservice schooling and earnings for benefit users.
4Estimates of the proportion of prospective applicants who do not progress beyond exploratory
discussions range from 10 to 20 percent. Those who fail to progress include those who fail the
preliminary screening test or who lack the education credentials or who are involved with the legal
authorities; those who seek information but decide not to follow up; and unemployed persons who
seek immediate employment with no understanding of military requirements (Defense Department
1992).
5Enlistment is a multistage process typically involving several visits to different sites (Berryman,
Bell, and Lisowski 1983). Applicants talk with recruiters, take a written test (perhaps after a
preliminary shorter test given by recruiters) and undergo a medical examination, and can decide to
enter the Delayed Entry Program and postpone enlistment for a year or more. The data analyzed
below show that roughly two-thirds of the applicants who applied between 1976 and 1982 and
eventually went on active duty did so in the same year as the year of application. Thirty percent went38
on active duty in the year following the year of application, and 4 to 5 percent went on active duty in
the second year after the year of application.
6For example, the upper part of the score scale was normed against Air Force and Navy recruits
using ASVAB 2 as the reference test. The low end of the score scale was normed against Army
applicants who had taken ACB-73. Some of the reference tests used by the individual services had
also been incorrectly scored, and some reference score scales had been inflated by coaching.
7Also in 1980, a new set of norms was established when a nationally representative sample of high
school students was given the ASVAB 8A test as part of the Profiles of American Youth Study
undertaken in cooperation with the Labor Department. Score scales derived from the 1980 norms
became standard in October 1984. A new set of test forms, ASVAB 9/10/11, was also introduced at
this time. Since 1984, AFQT percentiles for the purpose of historical comparisons have been reported
using 1980 norms. In practice, however, AFQT scores derived from 1980 norms differ little from
scores derived from (corrected) WWII norms.
8Aspects of the applicant record-keeping system are described in the appendix to Berryman, Bell,
and Lisowski (1983).
9Roughly 11 to 15 percent of new recruits were female in the period 1979–1991 (Defense
Department 1992).
10After drawing this sample, I eliminated duplicate records using the procedure described above for
the population, and discarded records on entrants with more than two years between entry and
application or an entry date preceding the year of application.
11For men applying after October 1980, I converted the 1980 score scale provided on the USRDD
tapes to a corrected 1944 score scale with the aid of conversion tables provided by Les Willis at the
DMDC in Monterey, California.39
12Some applicants with very low test scores are nevertheless accepted to the military. Entry
standards also vary across the services. For example, the Marines have typically employed a lower
test-score cutoff than the Army.
13The notion that qualifications are endogenous is supported by Eitelberg et al.’s (1984, p. 48)
observation that ". . . aptitude and education Service screens are highly reactive to changes that occur
in the recruiting environment."
14Angrist (1993) provides a detailed discussion of the use of interaction terms as instruments in
2SLS estimation.4041
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